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CONFRONTATION IN CHILDREN’S CASES: 
THE DIMENSIONS OF LIMITED COVERAGE 
Robert P. Mosteller 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Application of the rules of evidence in cases involving 
children is often different than in those involving adults. The 
central reason for the variation is not difficult to understand. 
Children have limited capacities, and in providing evidence 
generally and presenting evidence in the courtroom, they face 
special challenges. In multiple minor ways, courts simply have 
no alternative other than making some adjustments. Frequently, 
judges will entertain more significant accommodations, as well, 
to avoid the loss of valuable evidence or minimize the trauma of 
testimony. In child sexual abuse cases, the revolting nature of 
the crimes puts its own emotional pressure on courts to admit 
the child’s evidence.  
Hearsay is particularly important in many cases in which 
children are victims because of the need to supplement the 
incomplete versions of events provided by children as witnesses 
in the stressful environment of trials. Initial statements regarding 
the events are often needed to convict because the crimes are 
committed in private with no outside witnesses and frequently no 
definitive physical or scientific evidence of either the crime or 
the identity of the perpetrator. 
Given these background facts, it would hardly be surprising 
if application of Crawford v. Washington and its new testimonial 
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statement approach to confrontation doctrine1 was more nuanced, 
complicated, and uncertain in cases involving children. Although 
the doctrine’s application is undeniably different, it is generally 
not less certain. The lines in most cases involving children are 
just as clear as in adult cases—perhaps even clearer for some 
commonly encountered situations.  
However, the general uncertainty and flexibility brought into 
the confrontation analysis by the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Michigan v. Bryant,2 with its elaborate multifactor 
test to determine whether the questioning relates to an ongoing 
emergency, will likely have a significant effect in children’s 
cases. The complicated Bryant test effectively gives lower courts 
a large measure of discretion in resolving the testimonial 
concept’s application by making the determination dependent 
upon numerous elements of the case, potentially going beyond 
the emergency issue that was the immediate focus of Bryant.3 
Where the law of confrontation goes from here, in general 
and in children’s cases, is hardly settled. As it now stands, the 
doctrine applies clearly only to a limited number of situations, 
regardless of whether the declarant is a child or an adult. In the 
large remainder of cases, lower courts make decisions regarding 
a potentially testimonial statement using a heavily fact-dependent 
and largely discretionary form of analysis that is likely to result 
in admission of apparently important and reliable, but un-
confronted, hearsay. We are moving toward a Confrontation 
Clause where Crawford is uniformly applied to a very modest 
number of cases and where, for a sizeable group of other cases, 
its application is unpredictable. This same pattern is found in 
                                                 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), refocused the 
Confrontation Clause on testimonial statements in sharp contrast to the 
trustworthiness or reliability basis of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
2 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
3 In Bryant, statements of a seriously injured man to police officers about 
the identity of the person who shot him and the circumstances of the 
shooting, although removed in time and space from the offense, were ruled 
nontestimonial because the police inquiry related to resolving the existence of 
an ongoing emergency. Id. at 1150.  
 Confrontation in Children’s Cases 395 
cases involving children.4 As the dimensions of the Crawford 
system were initially being defined, courts and commentators 
complained primarily of the unpredictability of Confrontation 
Clause law. Another two major questions should be added now: 
whether the lines drawn by the testimonial doctrine make sense, 
and, more significantly, whether the resulting system has been 
worth the effort. 
In Part II, I describe the somewhat uncertain future of the 
Crawford doctrine. As the doctrine is applied to hearsay of 
different types and in varying situations, its support among 
members of the Supreme Court has declined. In Part III, I 
demonstrate the clarity of application of the testimonial 
statement doctrine to most types of statements made by children. 
By bringing trial court discretion into play, Bryant has the 
potential to limit the application of the doctrine in the one area 
where protection has been clear. Part IV highlights the difficulty 
of reaching clear results for statements produced for multiple 
purposes. Part V examines a number of discrete issues involving 
principally the elicitation of testimony from children who testify, 
bemoaning the limited efforts to help facilitate and expand 
confrontation as an alternative to exclusion of the testimony or 
broadly denying defendants the right to confront child witnesses. 
II. THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF CRAWFORD AS CONSENSUS 
ERODES IN THE SUPREME COURT 
As the Crawford approach loses commitment within the 
Court, it is possible, although unlikely, that the testimonial 
statement doctrine could be greatly limited or wiped off the 
books. While the present Court is unlikely to do an about-face 
and reverse Crawford, the voting pattern shows declining 
support. The near consensus that existed in the Crawford 
                                                 
4 Although a few features of the analysis might resemble the old Roberts 
system, the new multi-factored analysis is directed to the definitional question 
of whether the statement is testimonial, whereas the old system focused upon 
the substantive issue of trustworthiness. See id. at 1162 (“In determining 
whether a declarant’s statements are testimonial, courts should look to all of 
the relevant circumstances.”). 
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decision—which commanded a 7-2 majority5—and Davis v. 
Washington—which was virtually unanimous6—is a relic of the 
past. 
On the one hand, Justice Scalia remains enthusiastically on 
board as architect and author of Crawford,7 Davis, California v. 
Giles,8 and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.9 Among the justices 
on the Court, Justice Ginsburg has been his most consistent 
supporter, apparently driven by her liberal views rather than 
Justice Scalia’s originalism. The remaining seven justices, 
however, are not consistent supporters of Crawford. 
Changes in the Court’s membership played a minor role in 
reducing support for the Crawford approach. When the more 
liberal Justices Stevens and Souter were replaced by the more 
moderate Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, whatever impact the right 
to confrontation might have had on criminal procedure was 
reduced.10 Justice Breyer’s conversion from a contributing member 
of the group of Justices and scholars who created the new 
Confrontation Clause doctrine that became Crawford,11 to a full-
fledged opponent, played a more major role. During oral argument 
in Giles, Breyer and Scalia had a telling exchange in which Breyer 
announced his impending exit from the Crawford enterprise: 
                                                 
5 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor agreed with the result, 
but they would have retained Roberts. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75–76 
(Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring).  
6 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Davis was unanimous but 
for Justice Thomas’ concurrence, which related to the lack of formality of the 
statement, which was not at issue in the case.  
7 Scalia has described Crawford as his favorite opinion. See JEFFREY 
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 317 
(2007). 
8 California v. Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
9 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
10 On the other hand, Justice Stevens’ sensitivity to domestic abuse may 
have also have produced his dissenting vote in Giles. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 
404 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s requiring subjective 
intent to silence the witness as a predicate for forfeiture by wrongdoing 
would disproportionately impact domestic violence prosecutions). 
11 Justice Breyer proposed examining an alternative to the Roberts system 
in his concurring opinion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140–43 (1999) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 Confrontation in Children’s Cases 397 
Justice Breyer: I joined Crawford, and Justice Scalia 
would like to kick me off the boat, which I’m rapidly 
leaving in any event, but the . . . . 
Justice Scalia: You jumped off in Crawford, I thought.12  
Justice Breyer’s vigorous dissent in Giles confirmed his 
departure.13 Concerns about the impact of Crawford on domestic 
violence prosecutions are likely at the heart of his shift in 
position.14 Justice Breyer is now a solid vote for a much 
different approach than the current Crawford-based doctrine 
offers, and potentially even for starting over.15  
Chief Justice Roberts supported the Crawford enterprise 
initially, joining the Davis and Giles opinions, but he turned 
away in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, joining 
the dissent in both opinions,16 and he joined Justice Sotomayor’s 
limiting opinion in Bryant. Justice Alito has had a similar voting 
pattern to Chief Justice Roberts, although his earlier support was 
even more limited.17 Three Justices, Roberts, Alito, and Breyer, 
constitute a solid group in opposition to Crawford’s approach, 
and Justice Kennedy, who authored a spirited dissent in 
Bullcoming18 appears to be part of that oppositional group.19  
                                                 
12 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (No. 07-
6053) [hereinafter Giles Transcript]. In the Bryant argument, Justice Breyer 
stated: “I joined Crawford, but I have to admit to you I have had many 
second thoughts when I’ve seen how far it has extended . . . .” Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 35, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-
150) [hereinafter Bryant Transcript]. 
13 See Giles, 554 U.S. at 381–404 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
14 See id. at 404 (noting the particular impact on domestic violence cases 
of the Court’s rule requiring intent to silence the witness for a forfeiture by 
wrongdoing). 
15 In the Giles argument, Justice Breyer expressed a strong opposition to 
Crawford’s approach: “[m]aybe we have to assume an intent to allow the 
contours of the Confrontation Clause to evolve as the law of evidence itself 
evolves.” Giles Transcript, supra note 12, at 34–35.  
16 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 U.S. 2705, 2723 (2011) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 
2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
17 See infra notes 23–24 (describing Justice Alito’s strict view of the 
formality requirement for testimonial statements). 
18 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Breyer joined Kennedy’s 
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Justice Thomas shares Justice Scalia’s commitment to the 
originalist jurisprudence on which the testimonial concept and 
the Crawford opinion are based, but he supports a much 
narrower definition of “testimonial” that requires strict formality 
of the statement.20 In Justice Thomas’s view, the statement must 
be memorialized in written or recorded form to be testimonial, a 
requirement that would significantly limit the application of the 
testimonial concept.21 Indeed, Justice Thomas takes the position 
that, except where statements are informally taken to evade 
confrontation, if the statement is not in written form or its 
modern equivalent (such as recorded interrogation in Crawford), 
it is not testimonial.22 Justice Alito has joined Justice Thomas’s 
                                                 
apparent repudiation of the Crawford doctrine in his dissent in Bullcoming.  
19 Although questioning in an oral argument is often poor evidence for a 
justice’s position, Kennedy’s questioning in the most recent confrontation 
case, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011), suggests a more supportive 
position regarding the Crawford approach to expert evidence than his recent 
dissents in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz would suggest. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 22, Williams, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (No. 10-8505) (apparently 
supporting the defendant’s position in noting that if the expert’s statement 
was not used for its truth it would be irrelevant). The other Justices—
Roberts, Alito, and Breyer—showed no signs of uncertainty in their 
opposition during that oral argument. See generally id. 
20 See Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism of the 
“Testimonial” Statement Concept, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 429, 433–38 
(2007) (discussing the majority’s softening of formality in the definition of 
“testimonial” as compared to the approach taken by Justice Thomas). 
21 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Confrontation 
Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions.”).  
22 In Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), Justice Thomas concurred 
in the judgment because the parties had not contested the testimonial quality 
of the statement. Nevertheless, he expressed his commitment to the 
fundamental requirement of formality of the statement, expressing his 
position as follows:  
 I write separately to note that I adhere to my view that statements 
like those made by the victim in this case do not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause. The contested evidence is indistinguishable 
from the statements made during police questioning in response to 
the report of domestic violence in Hammon v. Indiana, decided with 
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strict formality position.23 Thus, despite their approval of the 
holding in Crawford, Justices Thomas and Alito have expressed 
opposition to treating oral statements to the police as testimonial. 
Their position is contrary to the outcomes in Hammon v. 
Indiana24 and Giles,25 which both involved such oral statements. 
As a result, a majority of the Court now opposes finding 
ordinary witness statements to the police testimonial, eliminating 
the right of confrontation for a substantial category of the 
statements that lower courts routinely find within Crawford’s 
testimonial definition.26  
                                                 
Davis v. Washington. There, as here, the police questioning was not 
“a formalized dialogue”; it was not “sufficiently formal to resemble 
the Marian examinations” because “the statements were neither 
Mirandized nor custodial, nor accompanied by any similar indicia of 
formality”; and “there is no suggestion that the prosecution 
attempted to offer [Ms. Avie’s] hearsay evidence at trial in order to 
evade confrontation.”  
Id. at 377–78 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part)). 
23 In his Giles concurrence, Justice Alito wrote “separately to make clear 
that, like Justice Thomas, [he was] not convinced that the out-of-court 
statement at issue [t]here fell within the Confrontation Clause in the first 
place.” Id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring). 
24 In addition to a written statement by the victim, Hammon involved the 
police officer’s testimony regarding what she orally told him. See Davis, 547 
U.S. at 820. Given the position Justice Alito took in Giles to associate 
himself with Justice Thomas’ view, it is somewhat inexplicable that he joined 
the Davis opinion rather than joining Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion. See 
id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the oral statement given to the 
police in Hammon lacked sufficient formality to be considered testimonial). 
25 In Giles, Justices Thomas and Alito joined the opinion because the 
state had not contested the testimonial character of the statement to police. 
Giles, 554 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 377 (Alito, J., 
concurring).  
26 These two justices diverge, however, in their view of the propriety of 
treating forensic certificates as testimonial, Justice Thomas supporting that 
treatment and Justice Alito opposing it. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530, 2543 (2009) (Justice Thomas joining Justice Scalia’s 
opinion and Justice Alito joining Justice Kennedy’s dissent); see also 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709, 2723 (2011) (Justice 
Thomas joining Justice Ginsburg’s majority except as to two parts and Justice 
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Let’s imagine that the Court considers in its next term an 
oral statement to a police officer by a victim, and the 
prosecution challenges the testimonial quality of the oral 
statement on grounds that included its lack of formality. Were it 
not for stare decisis, the Court would presumably find the 
statement not testimonial by a vote of 5 to 4. Justice Thomas 
would join the four who dissented in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming—Roberts, Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito—to form a 
five-justice majority that would find the statement outside the 
testimonial definition. The newly reshaped doctrine would bar 
only the formally testimonial statements endorsed by Justice 
Thomas in his White concurrence, which include formal written 
statements, forensic certificates, and other formal testimonial 
documents of the type covered by Melendez-Diaz, as well as 
recorded interrogations at the stationhouse of the type involved 
in the Crawford case.27 However, assuming a commitment to 
stare decisis is sufficient to preserve the Hammon and Giles 
results, there appears to be a sustainable majority for Crawford’s 
basic testimonial statement approach, albeit with a limited reach.  
Justice Sotomayor provides the swing vote to shape the 
testimonial doctrine. Her opinion in Bryant effectively narrowed 
the scope of testimonial statements by expanding the meaning of 
ongoing emergency and enlarging the factors, including hearsay 
exceptions, relevant to a testimonial determination. She 
supported the Melendez-Diaz concept, but she suggested 
limitations on that aspect of the doctrine through her concurring 
opinion in Bullcoming.28 
                                                 
Alito joining Justice Kennedy’s dissent).  
27 It is a substantial question whether that retrenchment would cause the 
Court to overrule the Crawford doctrine and start over, or maintain the 
dramatically restricted doctrine going forward. 
28 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720–23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
Certiorari was granted a few days later to resolve the issue identified in her 
concurring opinion of whether testimonial documents are covered by the 
Confrontation Clause when used for the traditional non-hearsay purpose of 
supporting the opinion of a testifying expert. See People v. Williams, 939 
N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No. 
10-8505). 
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III. RESULTS IN CHILDREN’S CASES 
I will not restate here why I find analysis that focuses on the 
compromised intent or expectation of the child because of 
developmental limitations to be practically unhelpful,29 or why I 
conclude there is no reason to create a general exception for 
treating children as witnesses covered by the Confrontation 
Clause.30 Where the declarant is a child, Davis effectively shifts 
                                                 
29 See Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and 
Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 
917, 975–84 (2007). 
30 At this symposium, Professor Richard Friedman continued to argue for 
developing a general exception to treating young children as witness even 
when they make clearly accusatory statements to law enforcement officials 
because he contends their statements are qualitatively different from those 
made by adults and outside the definition of testimonial utterances. His 
proposal would eliminate all protections against these accusatory statements 
under the Confrontation Clause. He develops his generalized argument from 
the aberrational case of State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989). See 
Richard D. Friedman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Child Quasi-Witness (Nov. 11, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy); 
see also Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 
71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005). Webb involved virtually 
incomprehensible words uttered by an eighteen-month child, 779 P.2d at 
1108–09, which the state court ultimately held were insufficient as a matter 
of state law to support a guilty verdict. Id. at 1115. 
 As I have set out in an earlier article, when one reads the vast range of 
cases, particularly criminal cases, that involve the words of children 
presented through their hearsay statement, one finds these statements to be 
comprehensible assertions of functioning human beings with purposeful 
communicative abilities. They are not, I contend, mere pieces of evidence 
that are distinct in kind from the statements of adults. See Mosteller, supra 
note 29, at 975–76. Professor Friedman’s proposal, which unfortunately is 
not carefully cabined to the aberrational case, is ill-conceived and destructive 
of the limited confrontation rights defendants enjoy under the testimonial 
approach. His contention that the destruction of Confrontation Clause 
protections in this area would be offset by the creation of a right of 
examination of the child by a defendant-selected expert under the Due 
Process Clause is unfortunately highly unlikely under existing doctrine or as a 
matter of legislative grace in a world of constrained resources. Moreover, he 
provides no theory for a necessary link between his proposed destruction of 
Confrontation Clause coverage for children’s statements and creation of this 
new right. If there is a right of expert examination of children, it should 
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the court’s analysis of whether a statement is testimonial from 
the declarant’s purpose in giving a statement to the purpose of 
the questioner. Although Justice Scalia, citing Professor Richard 
Friedman’s work, contends that “[t]he declarant’s intent is what 
counts,”31 the Supreme Court in Bryant stated that “Davis 
requires a combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant 
and the interrogator.”32 In my view, courts analyze the intent of 
the questioner in children’s cases because that perspective has 
some potential to give the inquiry an objective base and avoid 
easy manipulation of outcomes.33 
A. Statements to Police 
In cases involving child declarants, statements to police are 
generally treated as testimonial because children are typically not 
                                                 
already have been recognized, particularly in the myriad of situations where 
the right of confrontation is not presently protected. Finally, courts can 
embrace his destruction of the Confrontation Clause right under his argument 
that such children’s statements are not testimonial even for accusatory 
statements made by children to government investigators without providing 
any compensating protection, and I fear that if they do anything with his 
proposal, this one-way denial of confrontation protection will be the result.  
31 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 
71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2005)). 
32 Id. at 1160 (majority opinion). 
33 In an earlier article, I elaborated on my analysis as follows: 
 In situations where the statement would be clearly testimonial if 
judged from the questioner’s perspective, courts generally reject 
limiting the testimonial concept based on either the subjective and 
limited child’s perspective or the similar result achieved by an 
objective approach considering the age and circumstances of the 
child. I suggest that [they] do so because they find outcomes based 
on those perspectives so unpalatable. The statement may be highly 
accusatorial and would have been clearly testimonial if it had been 
made by an adult, and the adult who is receiving the statement may 
fully appreciate its use. The courts seem most troubled that this 
analysis would permit the statement to be used despite extraordinary 
clear purpose by the government questioner, given the Supreme 
Court’s focus on the dangers of governmental manipulation. 
Mosteller, supra note 29, at 980 (citations omitted). 
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accessible to the police until after an ongoing emergency has 
concluded. However, Bryant may alter that result at the margins 
and potentially work more substantial changes in outcomes 
through its invitation to lower courts to apply an open-textured, 
multifactored analysis. 
In an earlier article, I wrote: 
 Unlike in domestic violence cases, the police do not 
generally encounter a child still in an emergency 
situation, nor does the child call an agent of the police, 
such as a 911 operator. Rather, in cases involving 
children, the police are summoned by parents or other 
adults after these private parties have secured the child’s 
immediate safety and often after they have determined 
that a crime has occurred. Perhaps also the uniformity of 
the response has resulted because Justice Scalia indicated 
that a mistake had likely been made in White regarding 
the statement of the child to the police.34 
The cases treat statements to the police as nontestimonial in 
the unusual situation where the police encounter the child in an 
undefined situation or a clear emergency.35 The Bryant decision 
                                                 
34 See id. at 949–50. In Wright v. State, 673 S.E.2d 249, 253 (Ga. 
2009), the Georgia Supreme Court found that statements made by a child, 
who was three or four at the time of the statement, were testimonial when 
made in response to an officer’s question regarding “what happened.” 
Wright, 673 S.E.2d at 253. The child’s mother had a bruise on her face. This 
conclusion was reached without extended analysis apparently because it was 
straightforward in the absence of evidence presented regarding an ongoing 
emergency. Id. 
35 In Commonwealth v. Patterson, 946 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2011), the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled nontestimonial the statements 
of a five-year-old child as the officers walked into what the court described 
as a “volatile and unstable scene of domestic disturbance.” The child stated: 
“He pushed Mommy into the wall. He had a gun.” Id. at 132. The statement 
was made spontaneously, without police questioning. The court concluded 
that there was nothing to indicate that it was made for any purpose other than 
securing aid. 
 Lagunas v. State, 187 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005), which was 
decided before the Davis decision, presents a fact pattern resembling an 
ordinary criminal case more than the typical child sexual abuse case. The 
child’s mother had been kidnapped from her home where a four-year-old 
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is unlikely to change the outcome in the typical situation, since 
no ongoing emergency will exist at the time the police have their 
first conversation with the child. However, Bryant will certainly 
add some flexibility for courts to find initial statements by a 
child to law enforcement officers to be nontestimonial by 
expanding the definition of an ongoing emergency to include 
those where the potential dangers to the child or the child’s 
condition, for example, have not been fully clarified.  
Questioning by law enforcement may serve many 
nontestimonial purposes. Bryant recognized that the existence or 
nature of the declarant’s injuries might be relevant to the 
primary purpose inquiry enunciated in Davis.36 The police may 
also want to learn the identity of the perpetrator to determine 
whether he remains a threat to other children or to the victim 
herself. If they are uncertain of the accuracy of information 
provided by adults caring for or having access to the child, the 
police may also want to confirm with the child the identity of 
the perpetrator. 
In most situations, those issues will be clearly resolved 
before the officers gain their first access to the child. In other 
cases, where a known perpetrator “flee[s] with little prospect of 
posing a threat to the public,” as occurred in both Illinois v. 
White37 and Davis, there is a diminished likelihood that an 
emergency continues. Nevertheless, after Bryant, arguments that 
a declaration by a child is nontestimonial will be quite plausible 
in a number of standard situations, such as where the perpetrator 
                                                 
child remained. A police officer returned to the home after the mother 
escaped, where he found the child. The officer asked the child “what 
happened to her mommy. And she stated that ‘A bad man had killed her and 
took her away.’” Id. at 508. The court concluded that the initial question was 
not testimonial because the officer’s questions were motivated by concerns 
for the safety and welfare of the child. The child’s response “amounted to a 
small child’s expressions of fear.” Id. at 519. The officer also asked follow-
up questions, which might be treated as testimonial, as the Supreme Court in 
Davis treated the victim’s statements after the defendant had left the 
premises. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
36 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. 
37 Illinois v. White, 502 U.S. 346, 349 (1992) (describing the babysitter 
being awakened by the child’s screams and seeing the defendant first leave 
the child’s room and then the house). 
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remains unidentified, may be a member of the household, or 
may potentially have continuing access to the child or other 
children. Indeed, before Bryant, in response to arguments of this 
type, courts found these statements to be nontestimonial because 
the period of the emergency was extended, and social workers 
were seen as questioning the child to meet their responsibility 
for her safety and welfare.38 After Bryant’s general expansion of 
the scope of emergencies and the types of concerns viewed as 
included in police questioning directed to resolving those 
emergencies, arguments of this sort will likely have more 
persuasive power if made regarding police inquiries of the child.  
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Bryant may have overstated the 
impact of the case on the Crawford testimonial doctrine. 
However, the opinion’s one clear impact is the signal it sends to 
lower courts, particularly trial courts, that the line between 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements is not clear. This is the 
case even when the statement was made to law enforcement 
officers regarding past criminal events, and the testimonial 
quality of the statement is subject to a fact-dependent and 
uncertain analysis. My sense is that in the wake of the Davis 
opinion, courts have consistently ruled that statements by 
                                                 
38 In Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 857–58 (Pa. 2009), 
cert. granted, vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1597 (2011), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court ruled that questioning by a county caseworker a week after an assault 
was nontestimonial because it was for the purpose of ensuring children’s 
safety given unresolved issues about who was the person responsible for the 
assault.  On remand from the United States Supreme Court after Bryant, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the result on largely the same grounds, 
albeit slightly broader grounds invited by Bryant. See Allshouse, 36 A.3d at 
176–82 (Pa. 2012). Similarly, in State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 778–80 (N.J. 
2008), the New Jersey Supreme Court found that questioning by a member of 
a special response team from the Division of Youth and Family Services was 
not testimonial because it was for the purpose of determining how to protect 
a injured child from the source of his injuries, which appeared to be the 
adults charged with his care. See generally Christopher C. Kendall, Note & 
Comment, Ongoing Emergency in Incest Cases: Forensic Interviewing Post 
Davis, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 157, 170–80 (2010) (arguing 
that in cases of incest the gathering of data to determine the identity of the 
perpetrator and to protect the child from continued victimization should be 
treated as nontestimonial because its purpose is to meet an ongoing 
emergency). 
406 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
children to law enforcement officers are testimonial, despite 
disliking the outcome, because they conclude that there are no 
credible alternative interpretations. This consistency in treating 
such statements as testimonial is in contrast to the early 
decisions after Crawford when a number of courts latched onto 
widely varying arguments in an apparent attempt to avoid 
finding the statements excluded under the Confrontation 
Clause.39 Whatever else results from Bryant, it provides judges 
with multiple additional grounds40 on which to justify admission 
when they are concerned about the consequences of excluding 
hearsay statements to the police, even those previously clearly 
testimonial statements made by children in relatively settled 
situations. Consistency will predictably diminish with regard to 
the admissibility of children’s statements to the police.41  
B. Statements to Family Members and Friends 
Statements to parents, family members, and friends are 
uniformly considered not testimonial. This result was solidified 
after Davis established that the primary purpose of the 
questioner was relevant. Courts freely assume that private 
individuals generally, and family members in particular, ask 
questions of the child for the primary purpose of ensuring the 
health and welfare of the child rather than prosecuting the 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27–29 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004), aff’d, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005) (ruling statement by victim to 
police officer not testimonial because not sufficiently formal in that it was 
spontaneous and made in the field), cert. granted, vacated, 548 U.S. 923 
(2006) (remanding “for further consideration in light of Davis”). 
40 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1175–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing the 
many types of factors to be considered by the trial court under the Court’s 
newly established open-ended and amorphous definition of an ongoing 
emergency). 
41 The implications of Bryant are likely to be felt in other areas as well. 
Statements to multidisciplinary teams, discussed later, see infra Part IV, 
which are frequently videotaped and introduced at trial, are not testimonial if 
made primarily for a medical purpose and if made during an ongoing 
emergency, both of which may be broadly construed after Bryant. They are 
testimonial if made for a clearly forensic purpose, and clarity may be difficult 
to find in Bryant’s wake. 
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perpetrator, even though both purposes are logically of 
concern.42  
Some lower courts have identified a more fundamental 
dichotomy, which the Supreme Court has certainly not rejected: 
statements to private individuals are categorically not 
testimonial,43 except in the rare situation where they were made 
purposefully to avoid the making of what would be considered a 
testimonial statement.44 In Michigan v. Bryant,45 Justice 
                                                 
42 In State v. Ahmed, 782 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that a statement made to the child’s 
grandmother outside an interview room was not testimonial. Its result was 
justified under both a far-reaching approach that the statement was 
nontestimonial because not made to a government official and a traditional 
approach regarding the purpose of the questioning. Id. Utilizing the 
traditional interpretation, it recognized that the child was expressing pain to a 
close relative from whom he expected help and comfort, albeit a statement 
made just outside the room where a formal interview by governmental 
officials was to occur. Id. Similarly, in State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250, 256 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007), the Washington Court of Appeals ruled that a child’s 
statement made to her family members was not testimonial because the 
questioners were not contemplating prosecution of a criminal case but rather 
were concerned about her physical well-being and future safety. 
43 In Ahmed, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that “[s]tatements 
made to nongovernmental questioners, who are ‘not acting in concert with or 
as an agent of the government’ are considered nontestimonial.” Ahmed, 782 
N.W.2d at 259 (quoting State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 514–15 (Minn. 
2006)). Similarly, in State v. Coder, 968 A.2d 1175 (N.J. 2009), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated the inference negatively: “neither mother acted 
‘predominantly as an agent/proxy or an operative for law enforcement in the 
collection of evidence of past crimes for use in a later criminal prosecution, 
circumstances that may well render the hearsay statements thereby procured 
testimonial under Crawford.’” Id. at 1186 (quoting Buda, 949 A.2d at 779–
80). 
 The Supreme Court of Tennessee in State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 
816 (Tenn. 2010), entertained making a ruling that statements made to private 
parties are per se not testimonial. However, following the lead of the 
Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Brown, 173 P.3d 612, 633 (Kan. 2007), 
it chose to avoid resting its result exclusively on that ground and instead 
applied a multi-factored analysis. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d at 818. 
44 In Davis, Justice Thomas acknowledged that statements to private 
individuals, which he believed were generally excluded from the class of 
testimonial statements, had to be considered testimonial if made to avoid the 
protections of the Confrontation Clause. He stated his position as follows: 
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Sotomayor noted that the Court in Davis had “explicitly reserved 
the question of ‘whether and when statements made to someone 
other than law enforcement personnel are “testimonial.”’”46 She 
remarked that Justice Scalia in his dissent had supported one of 
his arguments with King v. Brasier,47 a Framing-era English case 
involving a statement made by a child to her mother, a private 
citizen, just after the child had been sexually assaulted. 
However, Justice Scalia responded that he “remain[ed] agnostic 
about whether and when statements to nonstate actors are 
testimonial.”48 
The citation of Brasier has implications for several major 
issues of confrontation interpretation. As I have noted earlier, 
Brasier is a difficult case to analyze from an originalist point of 
view because at the time the Sixth Amendment was framed, the 
published version of the opinion discussed the competency of a 
young child to testify, without addressing hearsay and 
confrontation.49 However, Scalia quotes from a version of the 
case published some decades later. In this later version, the facts 
had been revised to indicate that the case involved a hearsay 
accusation by the child presented in court by her mother and 
another witness, which the English court ruled could not be 
received.50 If accepted as part of the originalist foundational 
understanding of excluded hearsay at the time of the 
Constitution’s framing, Brasier would alter current confrontation 
outcomes substantially. The statement of the child to her mother 
                                                 
“Because the Confrontation Clause sought to regulate prosecutorial abuse 
occurring through use of ex parte statements as evidence against the accused, 
it also reaches the use of technically informal statements when used to evade 
the formalized process.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
45 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143. 
46 See id. at 1155 n.3.  
47 King v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.) 202–03; 1 Leach 
199. She also commented that Chief Justice Rehnquist had cited it in 
Crawford. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69–70 (2004) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Scalia had previously cited Brasier in 
Davis. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
48 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1169 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
49 See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 927–29. 
50 Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 203; 1 Leach at 200. 
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and another private individual in Brasier are similar to those 
generally ruled nontestimonial by modern courts, but in Brasier, 
the statements were seen as equivalent to testimony. Brasier’s 
existence and citation are unlikely to have such a profound effect 
as to alter all these outcomes. I suspect that the broader 
interpretation will be ignored.51  
Indeed, the Court may well treat as nontestimonial all 
statements to private parties. Shortly after Crawford was 
decided, a few courts took that position. In State v. Geno,52 for 
example, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that a statement 
made by a child to the executive director of the local Children’s 
Assessment Center was nontestimonial, relying heavily on the 
fact that the person receiving the information was a private 
individual.53 This change or clarification of confrontation law 
would have a substantial effect. Many, likely most, individuals 
who receive accusatory statements from children are private 
individuals, and many organizations that conduct interviews of 
children are private nonprofit agencies and private organizations, 
such as hospitals.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Buda54 
goes a bit further and considers statements nontestimonial if 
made even to government investigators when they are not 
enforcing the criminal law. This more subtle distinction was 
made in a case involving questioning by an employee of the 
Office of Child Abuse Control at the Division of Youth and 
Family Services (“DYFS”): the court ruled that the statements 
were not testimonial because the questions were asked for a 
protective purpose. In the discussion of the work done by the 
interviewer, the court stated that the investigative role of the 
interviewer was civil in nature—as opposed to the criminal 
purpose of law enforcement—despite the fact that these civil and 
criminal systems were both operating against a defendant. The 
court concluded that “our inquiry is informed by the explicit 
recognition that a DYFS worker acting in a proper civil role 
                                                 
51 See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 931–32.  
52 State v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
53 Id. at 692. 
54 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008). 
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does not trigger considerations that are unique to criminal trials, 
including the Confrontation Clause.”55 Conceivably, the Supreme 
Court could rule that only criminal investigations conducted by 
law enforcement agents and those working in explicit 
cooperation with them are even potentially testimonial. While 
this would have little impact in most traditional criminal 
prosecutions, it would potentially change many of the current 
standard responses in children’s cases and sexual assault cases 
where governmental employees at social service agencies are 
frequently involved in interviews. 
C. Statements to Doctors 
In Bryant, the Court stated: 
When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an 
interrogation is to respond to an “ongoing emergency,” 
its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is 
not within the scope of the Clause. But there may be 
other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, 
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose 
of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. 
In making the primary purpose determination, standard 
rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as 
reliable, will be relevant. Where no such primary 
purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the 
concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the 
Confrontation Clause.56  
More specifically, the Court stated in Giles that “statements 
to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be 
excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules.”57 Thus, when doctors 
receive statements in the course of treatment, those statements 
are nontestimonial. In People v. Duhs,58 a doctor treated a three-
year-old child in the emergency room for second- and third-
degree burns to his feet. During the course of the examination, 
                                                 
55 Id. at 779. 
56 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
57 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008). 
58 People v. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011). 
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the doctor asked the child how he had been injured to properly 
administer treatment. The New York Court of Appeals stated that  
it is of no moment that the pediatrician may have had a 
secondary motive for her inquiry, namely, to fulfill her 
ethical and legal duty, as a mandatory reporter of child 
abuse, to investigate whether the child was potentially a 
victim of abuse. Her first and paramount duty was to 
render medical assistance to an injured child.59 
In an earlier article, I suggested that a broad reading should be 
given to medical purpose, which would usually include the identity 
of the perpetrator when statements are elicited during the initial 
medical exam or exams.60 This appears to be the pattern in the 
lower courts, and with the liberalizing impact of Bryant, one would 
assume at least such a broad interpretation would continue. 
However, simply citing the term “medical purpose” should not be 
a talisman. For example, an examination by a psychologist rather 
than a medical doctor secured weeks after an injury at the behest of 
law enforcement or a social service agency should have no 
presumption of nontestimonial status.61 Similarly, after the 
treatment inquiry has been completed, later interviews by medical 
personnel gathering evidence for prosecutions should be considered 
testimonial even though it is secured by medical personnel.62 
                                                 
59 Id. at 620; see also, e.g., People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 218–22 (Cal. 
2007) (ruling that response to question “what happened” from emergency 
room physician treating the victim for a laceration to his face and neck was 
nontestimonial and finding that reporting requirement for abuse does not 
transform doctors into investigative agents); State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 
287 (Tenn. 2008) (making a similar nontestimonial ruling for statements 
made by a rape victim to a nurse in the emergency room). 
60 Mosteller, supra note 29, at 950–57. But see David J. Carey, 
Reliability Discarded: The Irrelevance of the Medical Exception to Hearsay in 
Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 653 (2009) (protesting the effective expansion of medical hearsay 
exception and its use as a basis for exclusion of statements from testimonial 
concept). 
61 See Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 858–59 (Pa. 2009), 
cert. granted, vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1597 (2011) (not reaching the issue with 
regard to a psychologist interview two weeks after injury because it would 
have been harmless in any case). 
62 See Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 305 (ruling that statements to sexual 
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D. Statements to Social Workers 
Social workers for departments of social services generally 
have responsibilities that overlap with law enforcement duties, 
and statutes frequently require coordination between the two 
groups.63 Whether statements secured by social workers 
investigating potential abuse are testimonial depends on whether 
the statements are secured for the purpose of ensuring the 
child’s safety and well-being, or collecting information about 
past events for prosecutorial purposes.64 The degree of 
coordination with, and involvement by, the police can be 
critical.65 However, because it demonstrates the existence of an 
ongoing emergency, the most important factor, where it exists, 
is a genuine and immediate need to assess the circumstances for 
the purpose of protecting the child, which renders the statement 
nontestimonial under the rationale of Davis. 
In Bobadilla v. Carlson,66 the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit found an interview testimonial despite arguments 
by the government that the purpose was the welfare of the child, 
relying heavily on the lack of an ongoing emergency and the 
absence of an immediate need for protective action. The 
interview took place five days after the abuse, which was seen 
by the court as strong evidence that the purpose was to confirm 
past allegations of abuse rather than to assess immediate threats 
to the child’s health and welfare.67 A similar result was reached 
                                                 
assault nurse examiner subsequent to treatment in the emergency room were 
testimonial). 
63 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556(3)(f) (2011); see also Bobadilla v. 
Carlson, 575 F.3d 785, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2009). 
64 See State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 780 (N.J. 2008). 
65 See Bobadilla, 575 F.3d at 791–92; see also Styron v. State, 34 So. 
3d 724, 732 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). 
66 Bobadilla, 575 F.3d at 791. 
67 See id. at 791; see also Styron, 34 So. 3d at 732 (noting that the 
interview did not occur until four days after the report of molestation). Time 
must be evaluated relative to the information about the nature of the threat to 
the child’s safety. In Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 858 (Pa. 
2009), although a week had passed from the time of the abuse, the statement 
was ruled nontestimonial because the interview occurred only a day after the 
social worker received information that the threat to the child was from a 
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in State v. Hopkins, involving statements made by a child when 
a social worker visited the child for a second time after the child 
had made new disclosures regarding abuse.68 There, the court 
found that, although the second interview could be construed as 
protecting the child, it was far removed from the initial 
emergency and produced incriminating statements, and therefore 
was testimonial.69 By contrast, in State v. Buda,70 concern for the 
child’s safety was ongoing at the time of the interview since the 
social worker had reason to conclude the battered child needed 
protection from the adults charged with her basic care.71  
IV. MULTIPURPOSE STATEMENTS 
As the Court’s opinion in Davis concluded, a single 
statement—there, a call to a 911 operator—can have multiple 
purposes.72 In child sexual abuse cases, many statements can 
have multiple purposes, including statements made to sexual 
assault nurses. I will concentrate on a specialized form of the 
multipurpose statement. In child abuse cases, many jurisdictions 
have developed procedures for videotaped interviews that serve 
the purposes of multiple organizations. The recorded statement 
produced for these multiple parties is designed to reduce the 
number of times a child must be interviewed. Determining how 
to treat these interviews, and specifically the issue of their 
primary purpose, presents a challenge. The interview procedures 
create a record that serves very effectively as evidence at trial. It 
also has the potential nontestimonial purposes of protecting the 
child from future harm and facilitating treatment. 
Although the treatment of such an interview depends on the 
specific facts of the particular case, a large number of courts 
                                                 
person with immediate access to the child. 
68 State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
69 Id. at 256–58.  
70 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008). 
71 Id. at 778–80.  
72 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (stating that a 
conversation that begins as an interrogation to determine the need for 
emergency assistance can evolve into testimonial statements once the initial 
purpose has been achieved). 
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have found these statements to be testimonial, determining that 
there was no ongoing emergency and the primary purpose was 
to prove past facts for prosecution.73 However, the decisions of 
two state supreme courts that use differing modes of assessment 
for the primary purpose analysis illustrate the uncertainty of 
outcomes that is likely only to be exacerbated by the Bryant 
decision. 
In In re S.P.,74 the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that 
an interview conducted by CARES Northwest, a child abuse 
assessment center, was testimonial. It recognized the evaluation 
served a dual purpose for the child, referred to as N.  
N’s statements were necessary to provide an accurate 
diagnosis of whether N had been abused, but they were 
also necessary to develop and preserve evidence of the 
alleged abuse for later presentation in juvenile court. The 
two purposes “are concurrent and coequal; both are 
‘primary’ in the sense that neither takes precedence over 
the other.”75  
The S.P. court resolved the dual purpose by concluding that 
this agency, which acts as a proxy for the police, conducts the 
type of ex parte examinations that trigger Confrontation Clause 
protection. The court, therefore, concluded that statements by 
the child describing the abuse and identifying the perpetrator 
were testimonial.76 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 905 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he 
primary, if not the sole, purpose of the [Child Protection Team] interview 
was to investigate whether the crime of child sexual abuse had occurred, and 
to establish facts potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.”); In re 
Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 613 (Ill. 2008) (“Furthermore, since there is 
no indication that the primary purpose of the interview was for treatment and 
because [the child] was no longer in any danger from the respondent, it must 
be concluded that the main purpose of the interview was to gather 
information about past events for potential future prosecution.”). 
74 In re S.P., 215 P.3d 847 (Or. 2009). 
75 Id. at 864 (quoting State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah Cnty. v. 
S.P., 178 P.3d 318, 330 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)). 
76 Id. at 865. In State v. Moreno-Garcia, 260 P.3d 522, 527 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2011), the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that “[a]lthough we agree 
with the state that CARES’s functions are diagnostic and forensic, the 
forensic aspect is pervasive.”  
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In State v. Arnold,77 the Supreme Court of Ohio examined an 
interview by an employee of a Child Advocacy Center 
(“CAC”). The court considered the objectives of the interview 
to be neither exclusively for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment, nor solely for forensic investigation.78 The court took 
the view that neither police officers nor medical personnel in the 
multidisciplinary team became agents of the other and that the 
single interviewer acted as an agent of each team. The court 
ruled that statements made for medical diagnosis and treatment 
were nontestimonial. It ruled that other statements that served 
primarily a forensic or investigative purpose were testimonial. 
The court directed the lower courts to sort these statements out 
within the interview rather than treating them under a single 
category.79  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant may be read by 
courts to provide flexibility to make just this type of rule. 
However, Bryant did not suggest that emergencies continue 
forever, and it did not give license to courts to ignore the fact 
that an interview had only forensic purposes. Bryant will, 
nevertheless, push the dividing line at the margin in the direction 
of a nontestimonial determination.80 
                                                 
77 State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 2010). 
78 Id. at 782–83.  
79 Id. at 785–86. Albeit supposedly applicable only to hearsay analysis 
and not Confrontation Clause treatment, the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
pulled back from a categorical approach that excluded “medically pertinent 
statements just because they were made to a [sexual assault nurse examiner] 
when those same statements would be admissible if made to a doctor or to a 
nurse in the emergency room.” State v. Mendez, 242 P.3d 328, 339 (N.M. 
2010). Instead, it directed the courts to consider the substance and 
circumstances surrounding each individual statement, determining in each 
instance the purpose for which each was made. Id. at 339. Mendez overruled 
in part State v. Ortega, 175 P.3d 929 (N.M. 2007). See Kimberly Y. Chin, 
Note, “Minute and Separate”: Considering the Admissibility of Videotaped 
Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse Cases After Crawford and Davis, 
30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 99 (2010) (arguing for an approach that 
examines the videotaped interview closely and excludes only the specific 
portions that are testimonial). 
80 In State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 304–05 (Tenn. 2008), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the statements made by the victim to the 
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By contrast, the decision in S.P. has the very different effect 
of correcting what I see as a fundamental error in the effective 
burden of showing that a statement should enjoy Confrontation 
Clause protection. Most lower courts understood the Davis 
opinion to require that the defense show that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation was to create a testimonial 
statement. In essence, S.P. stands for the proposition that a 
statement is testimonial if one of the purposes of the 
interrogation was to create a testimonial statement. That 
allocation of the burden is the appropriate one in enforcing this 
constitutional right. The defendant should have a constitutional 
right to confront statements which were made with a substantial 
or significant purpose of creating a testimonial statement, or 
where that purpose was a clear motivating factor. Nothing about 
the structure or effect of the fundamental confrontation right 
suggests that it should be applied with reluctance, or indicates 
that a heavy burden should be placed on the defendant in 
claiming its application.81 However, even before the negative 
impact on Confrontation Clause protection that I anticipate from 
the Bryant decision, the cases did not recognize the importance 
of allocating the burden to the prosecution to show investigation 
of a crime was not a significant purpose, nor a trend to follow 
the path of S.P.  
                                                 
nurse in the emergency room were not testimonial but those made to the 
sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial. It stated: “We caution, 
however, that our conclusion in this case should not be interpreted as a 
blanket rule characterizing as testimonial all the portions of all out-of-court 
statements given by sexual assault victims to sexual assault nurse examiners.” 
Id. at 305. It suggested that in other cases, the interview may move from 
nontestimonial to testimonial, and trial courts should redact some portions of 
the interview rather than exclude it all. Id. Use of the latter approach that 
admits much of these interviews is likely to increase after Bryant. 
81 The analysis that I suggest should be followed is similar to that 
illustrated by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). There in 
the employment discrimination context, the Court determined that 
discrimination had been shown if the plaintiff showed that it was a 
“motivating factor” or “substantial factor” in the adverse employment action 
rather than the sole factor that was required under McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
 Confrontation in Children’s Cases 417 
V. OTHER ISSUES 
Courts in children’s cases have continued to make some 
progress in addressing a range of issues raised in eliciting 
statements outside of court, and in presenting children’s 
testimony when they appear at trial and are cross-examined. 
However, courts have largely failed to provide ways to facilitate 
meaningful confrontation in particularly challenging 
circumstances. 
A. Application of Melendez-Diaz Concepts in Children’s 
Cases 
Under Crawford’s testimonial doctrine, when a witness takes 
the stand and repeats an out-of-court statement that she has 
heard, the Confrontation Clause is implicated only if the 
statement being repeated by this “ear witness” was testimonial in 
nature. Thus, if a doctor takes the stand and repeats a child’s 
statement made to secure medical treatment, or if a grandmother 
takes the stand and repeats her granddaughter’s statements about 
sexual abuse elicited out of concern for the child’s welfare, no 
constitutional violation has occurred. The nontestimonial nature 
of the declarant’s statement means that it is exempt from 
scrutiny under the confrontation doctrine. 
However, the “ear witness” must testify. If instead, the 
child’s statements are presented through a document prepared by 
the “ear witness” with an expectation that it would be used as a 
record of past events for potential use in a criminal prosecution, 
then the Confrontation Clause is violated. This is not because 
the nature of the declarant’s original statement was testimonial, 
but because the repetition of that statement occurs in the form of 
a testimonial statement from the nontestifying “ear witness.” 
In Vega v. State,82 the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that 
the Confrontation Clause was violated when the content of a 
report of a sexual abuse examination by a nurse at a county 
child advocacy center was introduced through a doctor.83 The 
                                                 
82 Vega v. State, 236 P.3d 632 (Nev. 2010).  
83 Id. at 637–38.  
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court focused on whether an objective witness would reasonably 
have believed that the nurse’s statement would be available for 
use at a later trial.84 In Green v. State,85 the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals found the report of a sexual assault forensic 
examiner (“SAFE”) to be testimonial using the same reasoning.86  
This issue is similar to, but distinct from, the analysis used 
when determining the primary purpose of the interrogation. In 
Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia noted that “[b]usiness and public 
records are generally admissible absent confrontation not 
because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but 
because—having been created for the administration of an 
entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”87  
Justice Scalia is not describing an emergency purpose for the 
initial statement, but is resting the decision on the fact that the 
document reciting that statement was created for a 
nontestimonial purpose. The appropriate inquiry is whether the 
document was prepared with an understanding that it would be 
available for use at a later trial. In this inquiry, the intent of the 
declarant is irrelevant, because the testimonial act is that of the 
recorder in writing down the statement to be presented in court, 
not of the declarant in making the initial statement. Multiple-
purpose statements that are videotaped do not present this issue 
because the words of the initial declarant are mechanically 
reproduced in court. However, when it is memorialized through 
the potentially selective and inaccurate words of the interviewer, 
the same interview should be treated as testimonial if the person 
creating the written document understood that its purpose was to 
constitute evidence.  
  
                                                 
84 Id. at 638 (applying Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, rather than the 
primary purpose test under Davis). 
85 Green v. State, 22 A.3d 941 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
86 Id. at 950–56. 
87 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–41 (2009). He also observed 
that medical reports created for treatment purposes would not be testimonial. 
Id. at 2533 n.2. 
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B. Requirement of the Prosecution Calling the Witness 
Rather than Mere Availability to Satisfy Confronting 
the Witness 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court stated: “we reiterate that, 
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of 
his prior testimonial statements.”88 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court 
made clear that the defendant’s ability to call the witness for 
cross-examination is not sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause. The Court stated that  
the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the 
prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant 
to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to 
the defendant is not replaced by a system in which the 
prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits 
and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he 
chooses.89 
These principles should require that children be called to the 
stand by the prosecution before their statements may be 
introduced under this “present confrontation” exception to 
Crawford. I encourage use of this procedure in preference to 
loss of evidence to the prosecution and denial of confrontation to 
the defendant. To some readers, the insistence that children be 
called and, as discussed in the next section, questioned by the 
prosecution on direct about the crime and be subject to cross-
examination by the defense, may appear to be insensitive and to 
subject the victim to further victimization. Sensitivity is 
appropriate. However, prosecutors and researchers frequently 
find that children can be enabled to testify by carefully working 
with the child to familiarize her with the court proceedings.90 
                                                 
88 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). 
89 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (“[The witness] was subpoenaed, 
but she did not appear at . . . trial.” (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 820 (2006))).  
90 See Robert P. Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation 
of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 592 (2005); see also Eileen A. 
420 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
In State v. Caper,91 the Louisiana Court of Appeals applied 
these principles. It held that the defendant’s confrontation rights 
were violated where recorded testimonial statements of two 
children were presented but the children did not testify, 
“[a]lthough they were present at the courthouse and were 
available to be called as witnesses.”92 
C. The Meaning of “Subject to Cross-Examination” for 
Compliance with Confrontation Through Current 
Cross-Examination 
“Subject to cross-examination” requires the presence of the 
child on the stand in a situation where he or she can be asked 
questions, but it does require more than merely placing a child 
on the stand. I have argued previously for a requirement of 
“minimal capacity” for a witness, which most often presents an 
issue for very young children: 
To be sure, simply putting a child on the stand, 
regardless of her mental maturity, is not sufficient to 
eliminate all Confrontation Clause concerns. If, for 
example, a child is so young that she cannot be cross-
examined at all . . . the fact that she is physically present 
in the courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the 
demands of the Clause.” Confrontation theory, the Due 
Process Clause, or the competency concept must provide 
some constitutional floor, albeit certainly at a very low 
level, as to minimal testimonial adequacy. To date, 
                                                 
Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and Other 
Challenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558, 1575–76 (2009) 
(citing sources that most children are able to testify if prepared and supported 
in the process and that the outcome of the prosecution may have as much 
impact on the child’s well being as whether the child testifies). 
91 State v. Caper, 41 So. 3d 605 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
92 Id. at 607, 617. In State ex rel. D.G., 40 So. 3d 409, 411 (La. Ct. 
App. 2010), another panel of the Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled, after the 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded D.G. v. Louisiana, 130 S. Ct. 1729 
(2010), in light of Melendez-Diaz, that in a juvenile case where there is no 
jury, the prosecution making the child witness available is sufficient. The 
result appears plainly wrong. 
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courts have gone no further than Spotted War Bonnet in 
recognizing that a limit must exist, but not yet attempting 
a concrete definition.93  
In addition, two other types of relatively bright line rules 
should apply to how the testimony is elicited. First, the 
prosecution must make an effort to elicit the accusation of abuse 
from the child. Asking about innocuous details is not sufficient 
without asking about the criminal actions of the perpetrator. On 
the other hand, the child need not acknowledge the criminal 
activity, and can even deny it. However, the child must be asked 
about it. Such a question gives the witness an opportunity to 
make her accusation in the presence of the defendant and 
provides the jury a basis for evaluation, regardless of the answer 
given by the child to the prosecutor’s question regarding the 
alleged criminal activity.94 
In addition, I contend the participation of the child in cross-
examination is required, absent defense complicity in silencing 
the witness’ responses. 
If the child ceases answering questions before cross-
examination, she is clearly not available for cross-
examination because none was possible. However, if a 
child of minimal ability answers some cross-examination 
questions, she should be treated as available for cross-
examination if the questions answered give the jury a 
sufficient basis to evaluate her testimony.95 
A number of cases found limited responses by young 
witnesses minimally sufficient. Two cases from the Illinois 
Appeals Court are representative. In People v. Bryant,96 the 
seven-year-old victim described sex acts committed by the 
defendant under one count, but did not describe any conduct 
                                                 
93 Mosteller, supra note 90, at 596 (quoting United States v. Spotted War 
Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991)). In Cookson v. Schwartz, 556 
F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit characterized Spotted War 
Bonnet as dealing with “witnesses who are ‘too young’ or ‘too frightened’ to 
be cross-examined.” 
94 See Mosteller, supra note 90, at 585. 
95 Mosteller, supra note 29, at 991. 
96 People v. Bryant, 909 N.E.2d 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
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satisfying the charge in another count. The court nevertheless 
found the child subject to cross-examination about the second 
count because she answered defense counsel’s questions on 
cross-examination.97 Similarly, in People v. Major-Fisk,98 the 
court found a child subject to cross-examination where the child 
testified on direct examination that the defendant made the child 
sit on his hand—which could be seen as related to the conduct 
charged although without facts necessary to constitute a crime—
and then answered all the questions posed on cross-examination 
by defense counsel.99  
By contrast, the requisites of confrontation and availability 
for cross-examination were satisfied in People v. Learn,100 but 
the Illinois Appeals Court held the child’s testimony inadequate. 
The child gave only general answers to the prosecutor’s 
questions, but the prosecution generally attempted to elicit the 
accusation. The child admitted knowing the defendant, but when 
asked about going to the police station and whether she had been 
asked some questions there, she put her head down and began to 
cry. After a short recess, the prosecution asked whether the 
child felt better, to which the child responded that she did not 
know. The prosecution then asked no further questions.101 The 
trial court imposed no limitations on cross-examination,102 and 
the child answered all the questions asked by the defense on 
cross-examination, although defense counsel did not broach the 
subject of the crime with her.103 The requisites were satisfied 
because the prosecution attempted to elicit the accusation from 
the child and the child responded to defense questions on cross-
examination, which the defense apparently chose to limit to 
innocuous matters.  
                                                 
97 Id. at 400.  
98 People v. Major-Fisk, 923 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
99 Id. at 336; see also, e.g., Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 212 (Wyo. 
2008) (ruling that failure of memory by child does not affect the 
determination that the child was subject to cross-examination under the 
Confrontation Clause). 
100 People v. Learn, 819 N.E.2d 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
101 Id. at 1048–49.  
102 Id. at 1050. 
103 Id. at 1057 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
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These minimal requirements for availability for cross-
examination will be challenging to apply, for example, when 
determining when a child who is predominantly unresponsive 
has responded sufficiently on cross-examination. Realistically, 
little is required beyond the presence of a minimally competent 
child on the stand, along with both an effort by the prosecution 
to secure an accusation and an opportunity for the defense to ask 
questions of a child who is minimally responsive.104  
The logistics of when to introduce the prior statement of the 
child, relative to the child’s testimony, present challenges in 
assuring the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the child 
regarding the out-of-court statement. Myer v. State105 dealt with 
the important issue of the timing of cross-examination: the 
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that, when a statement is 
admitted after the child’s testimony, the defense must be 
permitted to recall the child for cross-examination.106 
D. Alternative Methods of Achieving Confrontation 
Efforts should be made to encourage confrontation rather 
than to focus on excluding testimony.107 Any change to current 
doctrine that reduces confrontation is arguably problematic. 
However, when the only available options are the exclusion of 
evidence or a ruling that the defendant’s confrontation rights 
                                                 
104 This is only modestly different from the concept of the “The ‘Warm 
Breathing Body’ Rule” suggested by Professor Eileen Scallen. See Scallen, 
supra note 90, at 1575–81. 
105 Myer v. State, 943 A.2d 615 (Md. 2008). 
106 Id. at 626–29; cf. Hernandez v. Schuetzle, No. 1:07-cv-056, 2009 
WL 395781, at *28 (D.N.D. Feb. 17, 2009) (indicating skepticism of the 
state’s argument that the burden of calling a child witness could be placed 
generally on the defendant, but recognizing that there might be an argument 
for a different result where the child appears and testifies about the acts 
related to the charged conduct, and the burden-shifting relates only to hearsay 
statements regarding uncharged bad act evidence); State v. Hill, 715 S.E.2d 
368, 375 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (finding no error when the child’s recorded 
statement was introduced after she had completed her examination, given that 
the defense was not prohibited from recalling her to examine the child 
regarding the statement). 
107 See Mosteller, supra note 90, at 519. 
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either did not exist or were not violated, some compromise 
regarding the degree of confrontation required may be the best 
course. This is particularly true in cases involving abhorrent 
crimes and sympathetic victims, which put great pressure on the 
courts to admit incriminating hearsay that is apparently reliable 
despite a lack of confrontation. Unfortunately, only modest 
efforts have been made to secure more testimony and 
confrontation through the creation of alternative procedures, 
such as having hearings prior to trial where witnesses can testify 
and face confrontation. 
The Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that the preliminary 
hearing under the state’s criminal procedure guaranteed to 
defendants an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. It 
permits examination into credibility and does not limit the scope 
of cross-examination to only matters of probable cause. 
Moreover, the state permits discovery before the preliminary 
hearing.108 On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court ruled 
that its discovery deposition procedure was inadequate to 
constitute prior confrontation. It reasoned that the procedure “was 
not designed as an opportunity to engage in adversarial testing of 
the evidence against the defendant” but instead “to learn what the 
testimony will be,” and that the defendant could not conduct an 
adequate cross-examination during a deposition when he learns 
for the first time of the information. Moreover, the deposition 
could not serve as “the functional substitute for in-court 
confrontation” because it was admissible only for the purpose of 
impeachment and the defendant was not entitled to be present.109 
Like Nevada, states should develop alternative procedures to 
allow the defendant to have an opportunity to challenge witnesses’ 
testimony before trial or in alternative procedural settings. 
However, Texas has gone too far in authorizing the receipt of 
recorded testimony with only the opportunity for cross-
                                                 
108 See Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 484–86 (Nev. 2009). 
109 Blanton v. State, 978 So. 2d 149, 155 (Fla. 2008); see also State v. 
Lopez, 974 So. 2d 340, 347–50 (Fla. 2008) (citing State v. Basiliere, 353 So. 
2d 820, 824–25 (Fla. 1977)) (reaching the same conclusion and setting out 
the analysis summarized in Blanton). 
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examination through written interrogatories.110 The lack of the 
opportunity for the jury to observe how questions are asked, and 
how the child gives the answers, is a central failing of this 
alternative procedure. Nevertheless, the state’s effort to provide 
somewhat limited confrontation if, in fact, full confrontation is 
not feasible is commendable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Confrontation Clause results in cases involving child 
declarants under the Crawford testimonial model have been 
reasonably stable and consistent over the past few years. Courts 
have found statements to police officers testimonial in almost all 
cases. In a substantial number of cases, courts concluded that 
where social workers or forensic interviewers conducted recorded 
interviews with an investigative purpose, the statements secured 
were testimonial. Relatively few cases found such interviews to 
be responding to an ongoing emergency. However, statements by 
children in the vast bulk of other circumstances were generally 
found to be nontestimonial. 
The apparent clarity of the Supreme Court’s directive can 
account, at least in part, for the relatively consistent findings that 
statements were testimonial in the two situations described above. 
Davis appeared to draw a clear line with respect to timing and 
purpose, and courts acted as if they had no real alternative. 
Unfortunately, the Bryant decision will likely inject substantially 
more discretion—and therefore uncertainty—into the analysis of 
these two classes of statements, with the result that many of them 
will now be found nontestimonial. 
Crawford has provided some protection to defendants from 
government-generated hearsay of the most dangerous 
accusatorial type. When statements are made to the police or 
their clear surrogates, the protection is substantial. Relatively 
                                                 
110 See Coronado v. State, 310 S.W.3d 156, 162–65 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2010). The procedure is only used where the child is found unavailable, but 
the existence of the alternative procedure presents a far too inviting incentive 
for the prosecution to develop evidence of trauma if the child testifies and far 
too easy an avenue for avoiding real confrontation for the judge. 
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little else receives any protection under the Confrontation 
Clause. I am not convinced that the system that has resulted 
from Crawford, where the vast bulk of even accusatorial 
statements made to others are freed from confrontation, is 
rational under confrontation policy or consistent with history. It 
is unclear whether Crawford’s impact on children’s cases was 
worth the substantial upheaval in trial courts reflected in the 
mass of litigation it engendered. If Bryant has the effect that I 
anticipate of expanding trial court discretion to find even 
statements to government investigators exempt from 
confrontation protection, that impact will be even more modest 
and the current predictability of results will diminish.  
For those who hold a defendant’s right to confront witnesses 
in high regard, the Crawford effort was likely still justified 
because it requires confrontation or exclusion for the particularly 
problematic category of statements made by alleged accomplices 
during police interrogation, and, at least prior to Bryant, strictly 
regulated most statements by witnesses to the police about past 
events. However, the doctrine’s dimensions are far less 
substantial, protective, and beneficial than could reasonably have 
been anticipated when it was first decided. The Crawford 
approach is an improvement on Ohio v. Roberts,111 but its 
development has been disappointing, and the evolving doctrine 
shows limited promise. 
 
                                                 
111 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (describing a system of 
confrontation analysis replaced by Crawford). 
